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RESTRICTING THE BROADCAST OF ELECTIONDAY PROJECTIONS: A JUSTIFIABLE
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
I.

INTRODUCTION

On Tuesday, November 4, 1980, voters went to polling places
across the United States to elect their fortieth president. That same
day, at 8:15 P.M. eastern standard time, from its New York City election headquarters, the National Broadcasting Company "called" the
election based on its own computer projections;1 declaring Ronald Reagan the president of the United States. While hailed for its quick accuracy, this projection also produced a controversy unparalleled in the
brief history of network television coverage of national elections."
Almost immediately after the 1980 elections were over, criticism
surfaced surrounding the effect of NBC's early projection. Articles, reports, and letters were written describing how voting lines outside polling places disappeared, how turnout decreased over prior years, and
how voters stayed home after it became apparent that their favored
candidates had already won or lost.3 Common to most of the objections
condemning the broadcast of early projections was the desire to eliminate any future reoccurrences of this asserted impairment of the right
to vote.
In response to this reaction, congressional hearings were held, private studies were conducted, and remedial bills were proposed by members of Congress.5 However, as time passed and the fervor quieted, the

1. The Race to 'Call' Elections, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 11, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1980, at A32, col. 1.
2. Light, Effect of Media Projections on Pacific Coast Voting under CongressionalStudy,
39 CONG. Q. WEEK. REP. 1437 (1981). "The television networks have been projecting winners for
presidential races since 1964. But no media election calls have spawned this much controversy."
Id.
3. Election Day Practices and Election Projections: Hearings Before the Task Force on
Elections of the Comm. on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection,and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess's 123-25, 130-32 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Election Day Practices];
Early Election Returns and Projections Affecting the Electoral Process: Hearings Before the
Comm. on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-66,
195-217 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Early Election Returns); Rowen, Turning off the
Tube, NEw REPuBac, Dec. 13, 1980, at 6; Turner, How the West Was Made to Feel That Its
Votes Would Not Count, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1980, at A32, col. 1.
4. See supra notes 1-3.
5. Hearings, Election Day Practices.supra note 3; Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra
note 3.
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bills before Congress were allowed to die; no further action was ever

taken.'
This comment will examine the controversy created by early projection broadcasts, focusing on the conflict between the networks'

claimed first amendment right to broadcast the projections versus the
voters' right to exercise the franchise free from impairment. While several suggested solutions to the problem will be explored, this comment
will conclude that a legislative restriction on the broadcast of election
projections while polls remain open is the necessary remedy.
II.

EARLY PROJECTIONS-METHOD AND EFFECT

NBC arrives at the election results it projects through the use of
exit-polling, 7 "intensive preelection information gathering, . . . key
precinct vote tabulations, and county-by-county vote comparisons. This
information is examined and analyzed by a 'decision desk' team from
the NBC News election unit. Making extensive use of computers,
skilled and experienced persons ultimately decide what that information means." 8 In this manner, NBC was able to project the results of
the 1980 presidential election while the polls were still open in at least
twenty-three states.'
The major concern about these early projections was later expressed by Representative Timothy E. Wirth during congressional
hearings on the subject of early broadcasting of election results. Mr.
Wirth, the presiding chairman, stated that "election night projections
can take on a life of their own that has a potentially disruptive and

6. At the time this comment was submitted for publication, it appeared that all of the legislation proposed in Congress to address the problem of the broadcast of early election projections
remained in or had died in committee. For a discussion of such proposals, see infra notes 73, 89
and accompanying text.
7. Because NBC was the first network to broadcast presidential election projections in the
1980 election, further explanation of election projection procedures will focus on the techniques
used by NBC. NBC makes extensive use of "exit-polls." Exit-polling involves the questioning of
voters as they leave the polls concerning how they voted. Hearings,Early Election Returns, supra
note 3, at 16-18. Through the careful interviewing of small numbers of voters in statistically
meaningful precincts, projections can be made before the polls close and the vote is tabulated. See
Weinraub, Networks in Dispute on Fast Projections, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1980, at A32, col. 1. It
should also be pointed out that the other two networks, ABC and CBS, have not used exit-polling
in making projections. See Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of
William A. Leonard, president of CBS News). CBS has used exit-polling for demographic study,
relying almost entirely on an analysis of selective precincts for its estimation procedure. See also
id. at 11 (statement of Richard C. Wald, senior vice president of ABC News) (ABC did not use
exit-polling to project races, but for purposes of analysis).
8. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of William J. Small,
president of NBC News).
9. Race to 'Call' Elections, supra note 1, at 11.
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long-term influence beyond viewer's living room." 10 To a significant extent, the "disruptive" influence Mr. Wirth alluded to was in fact documented during the 1980 elections. Several studies have shown that, of
those areas exposed to the early projection while polls remained open,
actual decline in voter turnout was 2 to 3%.11 Other studies place the
percentage of voter decline at a much higher level, perhaps as high as
11%.12 This 11% figure is not unbelievable if one considers that an average of up to 25% of the persons who vote do so after 6:00 P.M.1 8
Even if the I1% figure is rejected, however, some examples from
the 1980 elections reveal that a mere 2% decline in voter turnout can
have significant effects. For example, in the United States House of
Representatives race for the twenty-first district in California, Democratic incumbent James Corman lost to the Republican challenger
Bobbi Fielder by a margin of 864 votes out of a total of 145,440 votes
cast.1 4 If the total vote had been increased by only 2% and Corman
could have obtained 65% of those additional votes, he would have won
by nine votes. 5
Another example is found in the Oregon congressional race between Democrat Al Ullman, who had been a member of Congress for
twenty-four years, and the challenger, Republican Denny Smith. Smith
won the election, but by a margin of less than 2% of the votes cast. 16
Thus, even a 2% decline in voter turnout can have significant effects on
17
election results.
By far, the greatest amount of evidence available regarding
early
projections concerns how the projections were perceived and interpreted
by individuals who had not yet voted. The prevalent reaction was that

10. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Timothy E.
Wirth, chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and
Finance).
11. Id. at 151-56 (statement of Prof. Wolfinger); id. at 156-61 (statement of Prof. Percy
H. Tannenbaum); id. at 303-05 (statement of Laura L. Appleton and John R. Dugan).
12. Hearings, Election Day Practices,supra note 3, at 117-22 (statement of Prof. John E.
Jackson).
13. Light, supra note 2, at 1437.
14. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 55 (statement of Dr. Austin
Ranney).
15. Id. This argument is not merely conjectural. There is evidence showing that in the 21st
district in California, there may have been up to 5900 Democrats that did not vote while the
number of Republicans who refrained from voting was only 1500. Id. at 126 (statement of Rep.
Jerry Lewis).
16. Id. at 217 (statement of Raymond A. Phelps).
17. The reason for this is that the electoral vote of each state is cast as a unit and the
victorious presidential and vice presidential candidates in each state win the state's entire electoral
vote. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § I & amend. XII; Annot., 153 A.L.R. 1066 (1944).
Consequently, since 2% of the vote or less could be the margin of victory in a given state, the early
projections could be responsible for the placement of a state's electoral vote.
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upon hearing the early projection, the individual voter felt that his or
her vote no longer counted. 8 People standing in lines, waiting to vote,
turned and left upon hearing the projection that Reagan had won. 9 As
one speaker at the hearings stated, "Commonsense [sic] tells you it
would affect some people, and I can't imagine a network executive anywhere who would not fight to the bitter end to prevent the final score of
a football game from being flashed on the screen during the first quarter."2 0 It is apparent that the early projections actually caused some
voters to refrain from exercising their right to vote.2" Thus, the claim of
some of those voters who resided in states where polls remained open
after election projections were made is that the projections infringed
upon their right to vote. 22
III.

THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Despite claims that early election projections infringed upon the
rights of certain voters to cast their ballots, television networks claim
that the first amendment guarantees them the right to make such projections.2 s Thus, the controversy surrounding early election projections
is based on a confrontation between two of this country's most valued
and protected freedoms. On one side stands freedom of speech,24 regarded as fundamental and traditionally accorded the highest degree of
protection by the courts.2 5 On the other side of the controversy stands
18. For example, a survey by the Los Angeles Times showed that 71% of those interviewed
felt that they had been deprived of the right to an effective and meaningful vote. Hearings, Early
Election Returns, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Timothy E. Wirth).
19. See, e.g., id. at 175 (statement of B. Teri Burns); id. at 115 (statement of March Fong
Eu, secretary of state, State of California); id. at 225 (statement of C. Lynn Smith).
20. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Al Swift).
21. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. The most recent and comprehensive
study was conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Specific
findings from the study indicate that overall voter turnout declined by 6 to I1% as a result of the
early projections. Hearings,Election Day Practices.supra note 3, at 18 (statement of Rep. Mario
Biaggi) (citing research of the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, excerpted in id. at 117-22).
22. One should note that the claim that the early broadcast of election projections infringes
upon the right to vote is not based on conjecture nor is it unfounded. Those who would suggest
that there is no infringement on the right to vote when election projections are broadcast before all
the polls are closed have misconstrued the essence of elections. The fundamental purpose of an
election is to allow the voters a meaningful choice of a candidate to serve them. Under our democratic system, the outcome of an election, by necessity, should not be projected during the election,
but should await the accurate tabulation of the votes cast after all of the polls have closed. However, because the accuracy of these projections is almost always correct, once the projection is
made the selection of the winning candidate has been made and there might be no further felt
need for postprojection voting. This comment will show that this is what happens and that early
projections effectually disenfranchise the voter.
23. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 348-49.
24. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
25. See, e.g.. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
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the right to vote, an indisputably essential element of any democratic
6
society.
A.

The Right to Vote

1.

Judicial Protection of the Right to Vote

The right to vote is considered one of this nation's most important
rights.'7 Our democratic government is based upon the precept that the
decisionmakers are under effective popular control.' 8 Because this goal
can only be maintained through the use of the vote, courts and legal
scholars have repeatedly recognized that elections are a fundamental
element of our democracy."
The Framers of the Constitution evidenced their belief in the importance and necessity of the right to vote when they provided in the
Constitution that Congress and the President shall be elected,30 and a
republican form of federal government shall be guaranteed. 1
As such, the government must derive all its powers directly or indirectly from the people.8 ' Against this background, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized the right to vote as fundamental. The
Court has stated that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live." 38 Consequently, the Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the right to vote must be protected,

1 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Justice Cardozo characterized freedom of
speech as fundamental to liberty because our history, politics, and law recognized freedom of
thought and speech as the "indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
26. Race to 'Call' Elections, supra note 1, at 11. The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), stated that:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.

Id.
27. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). The Court, in describing the right to vote
stated: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the election of
those who make the laws under which as good citizens, [they] must live." Id. The Court went on
to say that "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusion, if the right to vote is undermined."
Id.
28. H. MAYo, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 60 (1960).
29. "Free and honest elections are the very foundation of our republican form of government." McDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 288 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also infra
notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 2 & II, § 1.
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
33. Wesberry 376 U.S. at 17.

Published by eCommons, 1983

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:2

upholding the right in cases dealing with ballot access, 4 restrictions on
candidates, 5 and dilution of the vote through apportionment.3 6
At the very least, an examination of some of the cases in the area
of voting indicates the importance of being free to exercise the right.
More importantly, the cases reveal the Supreme Court's underlying
concern that people not only be allowed to vote, but be free to do so in
an effective and unimpaired manner. It is this important concern that is
at stake in the controversy surrounding early election projections.
2.

The Right to Vote-A Nonjudicial Approach

Evaluating the importance that the right to vote plays in our society requires an understanding of the reasons individuals value such a
right. Most importantly, a recognition of the motives of voters is necessary to accurately analyze the effect of early projections upon the voter.
One of the acknowledged reasons for voter participation is that it
establishes the legitimacy of the ruling body by allowing the public to
give its consent to rule. 7 Political theorists have tried to show that the
legitimacy of any government is the result of popular elections.38 It has
been suggested that political participation fosters legitimacy by "giving
the citizen a sense of proprietary interest in the outcomes of the political process, ' ' a since the citizen who votes does so to ensure that his or
her candidate is elected, and his or her interests are thereby protected.
Another reason advanced for voter participation is the desire of
the individual to exert some control over his or her environment'-that
is, to possess influence and achieve political efficacy. 1 Political partici-

34. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
35. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1969).
36. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
37. See generally S. RENSHON, PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 83-86
(1974).
38. G. POMPER, ELECTIONS IN AMERICA (1972). "The liberty of man in society is to be
under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth ...." Id.
at 26 (quoting 2 J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 127 (1943)). "To the framers of the Constitution, elections were unavoidable. Given the English tradition, no government could be considered
legitimate unless popularly chosen. While many delegates to the Philadelphia convention were
distrustful of popular wisdom, they also saw the practical necessity of popular elections. The
franchise brought consent even if not ideal policies." G. POMPER, supra, at 26.
39. S.RENSHON, supra note 37, at 84.
40. Id. at 86.
41. For support of the theory that voter participation stems from perceived voter influence,
see G. POMPER, supra note 38, at 64-67. For a general discussion of political efficacy, see S.
RENSHON, supra note 37, at 31, 32. See also J. MANHEIM, THE POLITICS WITHIN 130, 131
(1975).
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pation-most commonly in the form of voting-may fulfill an individual's need to control certain events that affect his or her life."' Control,
however, is more than mere participation. A voter must believe that in
exercising his or her right to vote, he or she has acted in an efficacious
manner; in other words, he or she must have engaged in some action
perceivable as successful.43 In this sense, political efficacy refers to a
feeling of individual "political potency"-a belief that as an individual
one can have an impact upon political events." Conversely, a person
who does not believe that his or her vote counts, or will be effective, is
unlikely to cast it.4"
Though many theories have been proposed to explain why people
vote, 4" it is apparent that an individual votes in order to satisfy desires
of legitimacy, control, influence, and effectiveness. When an individual
is made to feel that his or her vote is meaningless, no such reason to
vote exists. As a result, those responsible for creating such a feeling
within the voter have constructively disenfranchised the voter.
B.

Freedom of Speech and Press

Balanced against the fundamental right to vote lies the equally
fundamental guarantee of free expression. The first amendment protects freedom of speech and of the press.47 The right of freedom of
expression is undisputably another essential element of our society.4'
One political scientist has commented that "freedom of speech, a genus
of which a free press is one species, is rightly called the 'first freedom'
for political purposes, and in the discussion of public policy it comes
near to being absolute as it is possible to get in human society.""
The protection accorded speech and the press in our society is generally justified by three theories of the function of free expression. 0
42. S. RENSHON, supra note 37, at 43.
43. Id. at 86.
44. J. MANHEIM, supra note 41, at 115. Thus, the election of a candidate that one has
supported can prove a source of political efficacy. Id. at 130.
45. Id. at 115. See also Hearings,Election Day Practices, supra note 3, at 40-42 (statement of Rep. Pat Williams).
46. Other theories offered as reasons why people vote include: A) That it offers the voter
protection because it acts as a check on power, see G. POMPER, supra note 38, at 28, B) That it is
part of personal development, see id. at 27, and C) That it increases a person's self-respect and
individual worth, see id. at 11. See also J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GovERNMENT 203 (1883) (political participation is valuable because it enhances personal growth and
self-realization).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ").
48. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
49. H. MAYO, supra note 28, at 143.
50. For the purposes of this comment, the term freedom of expression will include both
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One theory emphasizes the function of freedom of speech in individual
self-expression and development of individual potential." A second theory is that freedom of expression is valuable in our system of representative democracy and self-government. 52 In Mills v. Alabama," the
United States Supreme Court reasoned that "[w]hatever differences
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."" This "free
discussion" theory was evident in a number of the early opinions that
laid the groundwork for development of the law surrounding the freedom of expression.55 The third theory justifying the protection accorded
free expression emphasizes the value of free expression in the search for
5 Justice
the truth.5 6 In a concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,
Brandeis stated:
Those who won our independence believed that .
freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people, that public discussion
is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government."

Because of such weighty justifications, some authorities have
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
51. The constitutional right of free expression is ... designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in
the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). Accord Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 15 (1957).
See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 476 (1973); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1108 (10th ed. 1980).
52. The freedoms of speech and press are fundamental personal rights and liberties, the
exercise of which "lies at the foundation of free government by free people." Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
53. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
54. Id. at 218.
55. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
56. "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail rather than tc 'countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the government itself or by a private licensee." Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
57. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled, Brandenburg. 395 U.S. at 447.
58. 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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claimed that absolute protection of free expression is the only way to
protect the first amendment guaranty. 9 Absolute protection of free expression, however, has been expressly rejected.60 Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized areas where free
speech is not given unlimited protection. Certain forms of speech have
been recognized as being outside the scope of constitutional protection. 61 Also, general regulatory statutes which are not intended to control the content of speech, but which incidentally limit its unfettered

59. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577 (1978) (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948)). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he First Amendment's unequivocal command that
there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech. . . shows that the men who drafted our
.
Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done ....
60. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). In Konigsberg, the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to the admission requirements of the California Bar that necessitated the applicant's responses to questions concerning Communist party membership. The petitioner claimed
that such questions unconstitutionally impinged upon his rights of speech and association. Id. at
49. In disallowing the petitioner's challenge, the Court stated: "At the outset we reject the view
that freedom of speech and association . . . as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes'...." Id. The Court noted that "[wihenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interest
involved." Id. at 51.
61. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscene material); Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libelous utterances); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) (fighting words); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (words which create a
clear and present danger). One should also note the approach of courts in the area of labor law
and collective bargaining. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Court recognized that the determination of whether particular utterances fall within the scope of the first
amendment must be made in light of the setting within which the expression is made. Id. at 617.
In holding that employer communications which contain a threat of reprisal, force, or promise of
benefit are not within the scope of the first amendment's protection, the Court stated:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the
context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal
rights of the employees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by § 8(a)(l) and the proviso to § 8(c). And any balancing of those rights must take
into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.
Id. See also Patsy Bee, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 515, 516, 517 (8th Cir. 1981) ("This court has
noted that under the Gissel analysis the employer's constitutionally protected right of free speech
may be circumscribed when in addressing employees he opposes unionization. The reason for this
is that the employees' relationship with their employer is such that the employee is more likely to
pick up intended implications of the latter.").
The same may be said of the voters. Television has come to play such an important part in
the lives of so many that the relationship has become one where the suggestions or projections of
the broadcaster carry with them implications of truth and accuracy likely to influence the viewer.
When the viewer is a voter who has yet to cast his or her vote, the influence becomes every bit as
harmful as the speech of the employer in the labor setting. Therefore any assessment of the precise scope of television media's expression must be made in the context of the national election
setting.
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exercise by restricting the time, place, or manner in which it may be
exercised, have been upheld upon a proper showing of valid governmen-

tal interests.

2

Because the first amendment's free expression guaranty retains a

cherished position in our constitutional system, but has not been
deemed absolute, it must be subject to a balancing process. 6 For example, there are certain areas where compelling governmental interests
will suffice to outweigh an individual's freedom of expression." Therefore, despite the apparently absolute language of the first amendment,

the government may assert interests sufficient to uphold a restriction on

expression.6 5 Although the government may be required to show a
"compelling interest" 66 or to "overcome a heavy presumption against

constitutional validity"67 or to "draw its statutes narrowly,"68 it may,
nevertheless, regulate speech in certain instances. Consequently, it can

be argued that speech in the form of the networks' early election pro-

jections has such a drastic effect on the right to vote that it creates an
instance where regulation would be appropriate."
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Action to resolve the problem of early election projections must be
62. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatre, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding an
ordinance limiting the places where adult movie theaters may be located); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting picketing near a courthouse); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (no first-amendment protection against ordinance prohibiting doorto-door distribution of commercial advertising); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding
an ordinance forbidding the use of raucous sound trucks).
63. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
(Court noting that it need weigh the right of free speech against the danger that such speech
would coerce and intimidate). See generally Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
64. See the cases cited supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
67. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
68. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
69. Even if the argument can be made that the infringement on the right to vote is merely a
constructive infringement because the voters are not physically prevented from voting, the infringement is nevertheless a real one. See supra note 22. Three alternative arguments can be
made in support of imposing a ban on the broadcast of election projections before the polls are
closed: 1)The protection of the right to vote in this situation rises to the level of a compelling
interest so as to justify the ban on election projections; 2) Such a ban on the broadcast of election
projections is merely a time, place, and manner restriction and not a prior restraint on speech; and
3) Election projections do not constitute protected speech within the meaning of the first amendment. These arguments will be set forth in more detail in the third section of this comment.
However, in light of these arguments, one should remember that the proposed ban on broadcasting
relates to election projections and not election results, which would arguably present a more persuasive countervailing argument against any attempt to impose restrictions.
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taken soon, because history supports the conclusion that the problem is
likely to worsen as technological advances make earlier forecasts feasible. In 1964, the Columbia Broadcasting System projected Lyndon B.
Johnson president at 9:03 P.M. eastern standard time. 70 An extensive
study of the 1964 election showed that the projection had no direct
effect on voter turnout and no significant effect on voter perception of
the worth of the vote.7 1 However, in the 1980 election, adverse effects

on voter turnout due to a projection made just one hour earlier have
been documented. Indeed, congressional testimony has indicated that
both NBC and ABC could have predicted the winners by noon on election day in 1980.72 Due to the race for network ratings and the advertising dollar, it is apparent that networks will in the future be competing for earliest projection honors.7 3 As they do so, the projections will
have an increasingly stronger effect since they will reach voters at an
earlier time.
A.

Legislative Ban on Early Projection Broadcasts
The simplest and most apparent solution would be to ban the

broadcasting of early projections until all the polls are closed. 4 For
various reasons, this appears to be a solution Congress has refused to
adopt, 75 choosing instead to request that the networks voluntarily re70. Light, supra note 2, at 1437.
71. See K. LANG & G. LANG, VOTING AND NONVOTING (1968).
72. The prediction could have been made based on the exit-polling done by the networks.
However, it was suggested that in order to avoid public criticism, NBC waited until later in the
day before making the projection. Hearings,.Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 59 (statement of Dr. Austin Ranney).
73. "This competition between the networks is further enhanced by the public relations
value of calling the winner early and accurately. 'Advertisers are often eager to sign up with the
winning network in future elections.'" Quoted in Hearings, Election Day Practices, supra note 3,
at 155.
74. See S. 762, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S2489 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1981).
This bill if enacted would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit the broadcasting of
election results or projections until all polling places in the United States are closed. This bill was
sent to committee, and, as of September of 1983, there was no further action taken on it.
A survey of public opinion by the Field Institute of San Francisco shows that 74% of those
questioned do in fact favor a prohibition against broadcasting any projections until the polls are
closed. Hearings. Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 3.
75. "I want to be quick to add that in our efforts to reform the election process we must
guard against any infringement of the first amendment guarantees of the freedom of the
press.
"We should in no way muzzle the media either by preventing the reporting of the
election results or by preventing the reporting of projections based on so-called exit polls."
Hearings, Election Day Practices, supra note 3, at 42 (statement of Rep. Pat Williams). While
reasons like the one given above by Representative Williams are the most common explanations
for refusing to ban the broadcast of early projections until all polls are closed, one can only wonder what effect the strong, well-funded television lobbyists have played in that congressional
decision.
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frain from broadcasting projections of election results until the polls are
closed.7 6 Yet a ban on the broadcast of early projections appears to be
the only truly viable solution--one which arguably could withstand judicial muster.
On its face, a ban on early projections appears to be prohibited by
the first amendment to the United States Constitution as an unlawful
prior restraint on free speech." Because the Supreme Court has said
that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," 7 8 it is
clear that a total ban on early projections could survive only if the government could show a compelling interest warranting it.7 9 A strong argument can be made that banning the broadcasting of early projections
does meet the compelling interest requirement.8 0 It can be persuasively
argued that this type of speech-the early projections-impairs the
right of an individual to vote. Although the early projections do not
amount to an actual denial of the franchise, a constructive denial exists
when voters are encouraged not to vote because they are made to feel
their votes do not count."' Because the United States Supreme Court
has recognized the right to vote as fundamental, 2 protecting that right
is a compelling governmental interest which would justify the limited
restraint imposed on free expression by prohibiting the broadcast of
early projections until the polls have closed in at least a majority of
states.
This argument, of course, cannot be merely theoretical. It must be
supported by sufficient empirical evidence revealing the significant adverse effect early projections have on the right to vote.83 Without such

76. H.R. Con. Res. 227, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See 129 CONG. REC. E5633 (daily
ed. Nov. 16, 1983) (statement of Rep. Al Swift).
77. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
78. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
79. See, e.g.. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
80. This type of argument was in fact suggested at the congressional hearings on the subject
of early election returns, where it was stated:
The first amendment. . . is not absolute. You cannot howler [sic] 'fire' in a movie theater.
The first amendment is, 'yes, but,' if there is a countervailing policy to limit it somewhat
• . .during a particular dozen or so hours once every 4 years when we are going through a
national election, I don't think anybody could construe that as an attack on the electoral
process. It would only be justified as a countervailing argument justifying some limitation
on the power of the press to report a result while the polls are open.
Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 29 (statement of Rep. James H. Scheuer).
81. See supra note 22.
82. See the cases cited supra notes 34-36.
83. The United States Supreme Court has relied heavily on the use of empirical data. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (counsel for the respondent made extensive use of empirical evidence to show that the Amish children could function effectively if they left school at

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss2/5

1984]

COMMENTS

evidence, governmental legislation banning projections could not withstand the strict scrutiny that would be applied to it in the courts." This
empirical evidence does exist, and can be found in the legislative hearings concerning the problem of early projections." History has shown
that the Court has given significant weight to the legislative findings
that have led to a particular enactment. 8 6 Therefore, the Court might
find a legislative ban on early projections, enacted to protect a valid
compelling governmental interest, constitutional.
In this manner Congress can give some assurance that early projections of election results, if they are in fact "speech" for first amendment purposes, will not threaten the foundation of our democratic form
of government-the right to vote. Certainly, in balancing these two interests it would seem reasonable to protect the right to vote since to
deny or even undermine this right poses a threat to our democratic
society far greater than would legislation requiring the networks to delay the broadcast of their election projections until the polls are closed.
A further argument in support of legislation banning broadcast of
election projections until all polls are closed is that such a statute
would be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction rather than a
prior restraint. 87 Whereas a prior restraint seeks to limit the content of

age 14 instead of the required age of 16); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Court relied on
empirical evidence in deciding when the state's interest in prohibiting abortion will be sufficient to
outweigh a woman's right to have one); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (in sustaining an
Oregon law that prohibited a female from working more than 10 hours a day in any factory or
laundry, the Court relied heavily on a brief Louis D. Brandeis prepared, which detailed the physical ability of a woman).
84. See First Nat'l Bank. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
85. See supra note 3.
86. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969).
87. A valid restriction under a time, place, and manner approach must be determined in
light of four basic considerations: (1) "the interest deemed to require the regulation of speech";
(2) "the method used to achieve such ends as a consequence of which public speech is constrained"; (3) the "mode of speech regulated"; and (4) where the regulated speech takes place. G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1199 (10th ed. 1980). Applying
these factors, prohibiting early election projections could be a valid time, place, and manner restriction. The interest deemed to require the regulation of speech is that of protecting, encouraging, and upholding the importance of the right to vote. The method used would most likely be a
prohibition against making any broadcast of election results until the polls are closed. The mode
of speech regulated is that broadcast over the national airwaves, a mode already subject to regulation in the public interest. See supra note 86; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Finally, the speech takes place over the national airwaves, where its reach is of an extraordinary
magnitude. It was reported that approximately 150 million Americans watched some of the television networks' coverage. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1980, at A25, col. 2. There is a strong argument
that this is a valid time, place, and manner restriction because the aim of legislation here would be
merely to delay the broadcast of election projections until the polls are closed. In this respect, the
legislation would not impermissibly be concerned with the content of the broadcast but rather with
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speech, a time, place, and manner restriction merely imposes limits on
the way it can be expressed. The United States Supreme Court has
held that ordinances regulating the use of a public forum for communicating views on national questions is valid if it serves a countervailing
public interest.8 8 This public interest concept underlies the regulation
of broadcasting as it stands today. a9 Thus, it can be argued that until
all ballots have been cast, the prevailing interest of protecting the right
to vote justifies a reasonable regulation on the broadcast of election-day
projections. Finally, another possible argument justifying a restriction
on such projections focuses on the categorization of speech and the reasons for protecting various types of speech. Historically, certain types
of speech have not warranted the great protection accorded speech generally.' 0 The argument supporting a legislative ban on early election
projections, then, is that the projections are not a type of speech which
warrants the highest protection.
It is generally accepted that one of the major purposes of the first
amendment was to protect free discussion and debate of governmental
affairs. 1 Central to this proposition is the notion of free exchange of
ideas-that persons not only have a right to speak, but also to hear and
to reply. Therefore, speech which leaves room for reply can be distinguished from (and is more likely to be protected than) speech which
triggers action or causes harm without the time or opportunity for
response. 9
Because open dialogue and free trade of ideas are the premises of

the reaction it engenders. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). It has been recognized that
"when the interests of the public are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the
broadcasters" the government will be acting within its power to institute regulation. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). However, it is clear that
any such restriction would have to be pursuant to a specific legislative enactment because the
Federal Communications Commission has expressly refused to enforce such a restriction in two
specific instances. In re Regan, 38 F.C.C.2d 378 (1972); In re Zeigler, 24 F.C.C.2d 434 (1970).
88. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the Court invalidated an ordinance
forbidding all public meetings in streets and other public places. In doing so, however, the Court
stated that although such ordinances cannot "in the guise of regulation" abridge or deny the right
to use a public forum for the communication of ideas, "[t]he privilege to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all." Id. at
515-16. As a corollary to this line of reasoning, one could argue that the airwaves, like streets and
parks, should be regulated to further the best interests of all.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1976); See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
90. See supra notes 61, 62.
91. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). This type of expression is protected because of "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open ....
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Central to this "national commitment" is the notion of the free exchange of ideas-that persons have
not only the right to speak, but to hear and reply. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.

92.

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
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protected speech, early election projections do not command the high
degree of protection accorded other types of speech. Indeed, in this
sense the projections more resemble Justice Holmes's illustration of the
man shouting fire. Network projections of election results do not encourage or even provide an opportunity for debate. Rather, they negatively impact upon the fundamental right to vote without providing a
counterbalancing need for protection. The projections should therefore
be banned.
B.

Other Proposed Solutions

Several solutions which do not involve placing a restriction on the
broadcast media have been suggested to resolve the problem of early
projection broadcasts. It does not appear, however, that any of the
other proposed solutions would adequately protect voters. One suggestion, proposed by former Senator Hayakawa, 3 would prohibit the release of results from any polls until all polls are closed. Theoretically,
this would mean that the networks could not make projections while
some citizens have not yet voted. However, by using exit-polling and
relying on voter interviews, projections could still be made.94 It therefore does not appear that this approach would solve the problem.9 5
Another suggestion for dealing with the problem of early election
projections is to have two-day voting. Under this proposal, voting in the
western states would begin on the eve of the traditional voting day. The
polls would be open for several hours Monday evening. Then on Tuesday, the rest of the country could vote as usual with polls in the western states closing several hours earlier than normal." This proposal,
however, presents two major problems. One problem is the potential for
overnight tampering with those votes already cast,9 7 and the other is
the cost of having two election days. It is estimated that such a procedure would add $2 million to the cost of elections in California alone. 8
Still another suggestion is to hold elections on Sunday or to make

93. S. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S106 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981). This bill
would have prohibited the broadcast of presidential election projections until all polls have been
closed. It appears that the bill died in committee. See also H.R. 3595, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in Hearings, Election Day Practices, supra note 3, at 12.
94. See supra note 72.
95. Some states have enacted laws prohibiting the taking of surveys within specified distances from polling places in an effort to place voters beyond the reach of exit-pollers. E.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 104.36 (West 1982). Such statutes, however, seem likely only to make exit-polling
more difficult without eliminating the practice.
96. Light, supra note 2, at 1438.
97. Id. See also Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 119 (statement of
March Fong Eu, secretary of state, State of California).
98. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 119.
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the regular Tuesday election day a national holiday." It is thought that
this would encourage a greater frequency of voting earlier in the day,
thereby eliminating or reducing the effects of early projections. However, while this may encourage earlier voting, it will not alleviate the
problem of early projection broadcasts. Because the networks are becoming more sophisticated in their methods and are more able to make
projections earlier in the day,100 increasing the percentage of early voters will not resolve the problem of early projection broadcasts.
Finally, two other widely recommended suggestions are to have
uniform closing times at the polls 01 or to extend daylight savings time
in the western states for two extra weeks in order to lessen the time
difference between states by one hour.102 These proposals assume that
the networks will not be able to make projections until some of the
polls are closed and that, therefore, given the uniform closing time, all
the polls will be closed. However, the networks' capability of making
projections by midday103 via their continued use of exit-polls'" would
still result in projected results being broadcast before the polls are
closed, especially as the networks aggressively compete for advertising
dollars.' 05
Additionally, all of the proposed remedies which fall short of
prohibiting early projection broadcasts in effect sacrifice the voters, of
Alaska and Hawaii. These states have time differences of four and six
hours respectively from the east coast. If the solution were to be uniform poll closing times, then both of these states would have to start
voting at an absurdly inconvenient hour and before most voters were
out of work, thus creating an equally distressing problem. Furthermore,
to the extent that any projections can be made in the continental
United States before all the polls close, they will be made that much
earlier in Alaska and Hawaii.
V.

CONCLUSION

The broadcast of early projections does have a negative impact on

99. Light, supra note 2, at 1438. See also H.R. 84, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1813, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Hearings, Election Day Practices, supra note 3, at 21, 7.
100. See supra notes 7, 72.
101. Light, supra note 2, at 1438. See also H.R. 3557, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
Hearings, Election Day Practices. supra note 3, at 47. For a discussion of the effect of adopting
uniform poll closing times, see Hearings, Election Day Practices, supra note 3, at 53, 60.
102. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 120, 121 (statement of March
Fong Eu, secretary of state, State of California).
103. See supra notes 7, 72.
104. Hearings, Early Election Returns, supra note 3, at 49 (statement of Rep. Timothy
Wirth).
105. See supra note 73.
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the right to vote. The procedures for testing and measuring the actual
effect the early projections had on the 1980 elections are sufficient to
show that the projections lessened voter turnout. Furthermore, even if
one discounts the statistical studies relating to the effect of early projections, there still remains a significant problem in that many persons
perceive that early projections nullify their vote. Voter apathy is the
unfortunate result.
Action must be taken to decrease voter apathy and to positively
nurture faith in our democratic system. Given the importance of the
right to vote, the adverse effect of early projections on the exercise-of
that right, and the fact that early projections are not the type of speech
which has traditionally received the highest protection, it appears that
the government has a strong interest in restricting the media's ability to
broadcast early projections. However, obtaining any effective legislation
will require a strong, concerted effort by Congress. Given the large,
well-funded media lobbyists on Capitol Hill, it will likely be a difficult
battle. Indeed, that Congress in its most recent action on this issue has
decided to refrain from enacting an outright prohibition in favor of a
resolution calling for voluntary restraint on the part of the broadcast
media evidences the difficulty inherent in obtaining a legislative prohibition in this area.
Nevertheless, to the extent that this voluntary restraint fails to
materialize on election day in 1984, Congress will have its back to the
wall. A repeat of election night 1980 can only serve as the most blatant
catalyst for legislative action. Congress cannot allow the broadcast media to operate in such a way as to ignore the public interest and undermine that which we value so greatly-the right to vote.
Stephen M. Leonardo
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